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LIABILITY AND PRIVATE CAUSES OF
ACTION FOR DAMAGES WHICH RESULT
FROM ILLEGAL FIREFIGHTER STRIKES
Although strikes by public employees are illegal in almost every
state,1 they are still fairly common.2 Damages resulting from a strike
1. Statutes declaring public employee strikes illegal include three types of statutory
schemes. One commentator summarized all three types:
One system prohibits strikes but provides for union recognition and exclusivity,
collective bargaining, and impasse procedures including mediation and factfinding
(the "collective bargaining group"). The second type provides for collective bar-
gaining and permits at least a limited right to strike (the "right to strike" group).
The third scheme prohibits strikes with no provision for collective bargaining (the
"absolute ban group"). Statutes in the first group include: 5 U.S.C.A. §§ 7102-
7123 (West 1980 & Supp. 1985); Cal. Gov't Code §§ 3500-3535 (West 1980 &
Supp. 1985); Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 7-467 to 475 (West 1972 & Supp. 1985);
Del. Code Ann. tit. 14, §§ 4001-4013 (1981 & Supp. 1984); tit. 19 §§ 1301-1312
(1979); Idaho Code §§ 44-1801 to 1811 (1977 & Supp. 1985) (firefighters), § 33-
1271 (1981) (teachers); Iowa Code Ann. §§ 20.1 to .27 (West 1978 & Supp. 1985);
Kan. Stat. Ann. §§ 72-5413 to 5432 (1980), §§ 75-4321 10 4337 (1984); Me. Rev.
Stat. Ann. tit. 26, §§ 961-972, 979 to 979N (1964 & Supp. 1984-1985); Md. Educ.
Code Ann. §§ 6-401 to -411 (1985 & Supp. 1985) (teachers); Mass. Gen. Laws
Ann. ch. 150E, §§ 1-15 (West 1982 & Supp. 1985); Mich. Comp. Laws. Ann.
§§ 423-202 to 209 (West 1978); Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 288.010 to .280 (1983); N.H.
Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 273-A:1 to :16 (1977 & Supp. 1983); N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 34:13A-
1 to 13 (West 1965 & Supp. 1985); N.Y. Civ. Serv. Law §§ 200-214 (McKinney
1983 & Supp. 1985); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 4117.01 to .23 (Page 1980 & Supp.
1984); Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 11, §§ 51-101 to 113 (West 1978 & Supp. 1984-1985)
(police and firefighters), tit. 70, §§ 509.1 to .10 (West 1972 & Supp. 1984-1985)
(teachers); S.D. Codified Laws Ann. §§ 3-18-1 to 17 (1980 & Supp. 1984); Tenn.
Code Ann. §§ 49-5-601 to 613 (1983) (teachers); Wash. Rev. Code Ann.
§§ 41.56.010 to .950 (1972 & Supp. 1986) (public employees).
Statutes including some provision for legal strikes include Alaska Stat.
§§ 23.40.070 to .260 (1984); Hawaii Rev. Stat. §§ 89-1 to 20 (1976 & Supp. 1984);
Illinois Public Labor Relations Act §§ 1-27, IM. Ann. Stat. ch. 48, §§ 1601-1627
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1985) (public employees generally); Illinois Educational Labor
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of essential public service employees are often enormous.3 State courts
differ greatly on who is liable for damages resulting from these illegal
strikes. Some courts allow recovery against public employees and un-
ions that violate state anti-strike provisions, theorizing that private
causes of action may deter public employee strikes.4 Other courts re-
Relations Act §§ 1-21, I1. Ann. Stat. ch. 48, §§ 1701-1721 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1985) (teachers); Minn. Stat. Ann. §§ 179A.01 to .25 (West Supp. 1985); Mont.
Code Ann. §§ 39-31-101 to 409 (1983); Or. Rev. Stat. §§ 243.650 to .782 (1981);
Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 43, §§ 1101.101 to .2301 (Purdon Supp. 1985); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit.
21, §§ 1721-1735 (1978 & Supp. 1985) (municipal employees); Wis. Stat. Ann.
§§ 111.70-111.97 (West 1974 & Supp. 1985). The typical provision in this group
either limits the right to strike to certain categories of employees or provides that
strikes may be enjoined on a showing of significant risk to the public safety, health,
or welfare.
The third group legislates a strike ban without a provision for collective bargain-
ing. See Fla. Const. art. I, § 7; Fla. Stat. § 447.505 (1983); Ga. Code Ann. §§ 45-
19-1 to 5 (1982); Tex. Stat. Ann. art. 5154c, § 3 (Vernon 1971) (public employees
generally), art. 5154c-1, § 2 (Vernon Supp. 1985) (police and firefighters); Va. Code
§ 40.1-55 to 57.1 (1981).
Dripps, New Directions for the Regulation of Public Employee Strikes, 60 N.Y.U. L.
REv. 590, 591-92 (1985).
2. The number of public employee work stoppages has increased steadily over the
past two decades, from 42 strikes in 1965 to 593 strikes in 1979. GOV'T EMPL. REL.
R P. (BNA) 71:1014 (1981) cited in Note, Damage Liability of Public Employee Unions
for Illegal Strikes, 23 B.C. L. REv. 1087, 1088 n. 13 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Damage
Liability].
3. For example, in Berger v. City of University City, 676 S.W.2d 39 (Mo. 1984),
restaurant owners suffered a loss in excess of 1.25 million dollars when their restaurant
was destroyed during a firefighters' strike. Similarly, in State v. Kansas City Firefight-
ers Local 42, 672 S.W.2d 99 (Mo. App. 1984), the state incurred several hundred thou-
sand dollars worth of expenses when the National Guard took over the duties of
striking firefighters.
Monetary loss is not the only damage which may result from an illegal firefighters'
strike. For example, in Jackson v. Byrne, 738 F.2d 1443 (7th Cir. 1984), the plaintiff
sued the mayor and the city of Chicago when two children died in a fire during an
illegal firefighters' strike. However, the plaintiffs' claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 failed
because the firefighters lacked a constitutional duty to act. Idt at 1446.
4. The first such case was Caso v. District Counsel 37, 43 A.D.2d 159, 350
N.Y.S.2d 173 (N.Y. App. Div. 1971), in which the court allowed a private action for
damages when striking sewage workers allowed raw sewage to be dumped into waters in
Manhattan. Other cases allowing private actions include: Pasadena Unified School
Dist. v. Pasadena Fed'n of Teachers, 72 Cal. App. 3d 100, 110, 140 Cal. Rptr. 41, 47
(Cal. Ct. App. 1977) (public school teachers' illegal strike); Kansas City Firefighters
Local 42, 672 S.W.2d at 109 (firefighters' strike); Boyle v. Anderson Firefighters Ass'n
Local 1262, 497 N.E.2d 1073 (Ind. 1986) (firefighters' strike).
Defendants in damage actions for employee strikes commonly include the municipal-
ity, firefighters' union, and individual strikers, although plaintiffs have not successfully
recovered damages from all of these categories of defendants.
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fuse to permit private lawsuits if a state statute exclusively provides a
governmental cause of action against strikers.5
This Note will examine the disparate treatment of public employee
strikes by state courts, focusing on liability for damages resulting from
illegal strikes by firefighters. Further, this Note will assert that state
courts should allow private damage actions for illegal public employee
strikes, absent express statutory language to the contrary. Finally, this
Note will examine the possible theories under which an individual may
pursue a private cause of action.
I. HISTORY
A. Private Causes of Action Not Allowed
Before 1971 no court permitted private citizens to recover damages
for illegal public employee strikes. Although many courts now allow
private actions, 6 some permit a cause of action only if special circum-
stances exist. 7
The Tennessee Supreme Court denied a private cause of action in
Fulenwider v. Firefighters Association Local 1784.8 The court held that
to maintain an action, the claimant must demonstrate a direct causal
connection between the illegal strike and the resulting personal injury
or property damage.9 The fact that illegally striking firefighters refused
to extinguish the fire that destroyed plaintiff's commercial property
5. See, e.g., Fulenwider v. Firefighters Ass'n Local Union 1784, 649 S.W.2d 268
(Tenn. Ct. App. 1982) (property owner had no enforceable rights arising out of city's
labor agreement with firefighters); City of Hammond v. Cataldi, 449 N.E.2d 1184 (Ind.
Ct. App. 1983) (firefighters had no special duty to property owner; therefore, property
owner lacked a private cause of action against striking firefighters).
6. See supra note 4.
7. See supra note 5. Further, some states deny private causes of action for damages
arising from illegal strikes because the anti-strike statutes specifically prohibit private
actions. Lamphere Schools v. Lamphere Fed'n of Teachers, 400 Mich. 104, 252
N.W.2d 818 (1977) (since anti-strike statute was exclusive source of remedy for illegal
strikes, and it failed to provide for private action, striking public teachers not subject to
private action).
8. 649 S.W.2d 268 (Tenn. 1982). In this case, the plaintiff property owner alleged
that an insufficient number of firefighters and a lack of dispatcher equipment, due to an
illegal firefighters' strike, contributed to the destruction of plaintiff's property. The
court found that the firefighters' strike, although illegal, did not alone create a nuisance.
Therefore, the court refused to hold striking firefighters liable for property damage
which occurred during the strike.
9. Id. at 272.
1988]
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was insufficient to impose liability on the strikers. 10 The court denied
that incidental damage during a strike amounts to intentional destruc-
tion of property and refused to allow a private cause of action against
the union and its members.11
Similarly, in City of Hammond v. Cataldi12 an Indiana court denied
a private right of action against a city for damages from an illegal
firefighters' strike.13 Before it would recognize a private cause of ac-
tion, the court required the claimant to demonstrate that the city owed
him a special duty. 4 The court reasoned that the breach of a general
duty to protect the public was insufficient to impose liability.15 The
Cataldi plaintiff lacked a private cause of action because he failed to
demonstrate that the firefighters owed him a special duty.16
Finally, in Burke & Thomas, Inc. v. International Organization of
Masters, Branch 617 the Washington Supreme Court rejected a private
action to recover lost business revenues resulting from an illegal strike
10. The court noted that it was unaware "of any case which has held that labor
activity alone, whether legal or illegal, amounted to a nuisance in and of itself." Id. at
270. In this case, unlike other cases, the ability of nonstrikers and others to put out the
fire was unimpeded by the strikers. Rather, the strikers simply refused to take any
action to fight the fire themselves. Id.
11. If the strikers had interfered with the attempts of non-striking firefighters and
volunteers to put out the fire, the Tennessee court may have imposed liability on the
strikers. Id Since the Tennessee court has yet to decide a case with this factual situa-
tion, however, the possible outcome is unknown.
12. 449 N.E.2d 1184 (Ind. 1983).
13. Id The owners of a restaurant sued the city to recover damages which occurred
when the restaurant burned down during a firefighters' strike. The plaintiffs failed to
sue the union or the individual strikers, who would be the more probable defendants in
a private action. 449 N.E.2d at 1185.
14. Id at 1187-1188. Thus, the Indiana court implicitly rejected the per se tort
theory in actions arising out of illegal strikes. In a per se tort action, the plaintiff does
not have to be a member of the class protected by the labor contract (in public employee
strikes, the protected party is the public employer, not the public itself.) Rather, the
plaintiff must only be injured by an illegal act. Damage Liability, supra note 2, at 1123.
15. The court stated that since firefighting is a discretionary duty, it does not give
rise to governmental liability. 449 N.E.2d at 1186. See also U.S. v. VARIG Airlines,
467 U.S. 797 (1984) (sovereign immunity applies to discretionary governmental
activities).
16. 449 N.E.2d at 1188. The court held that the fire department had only a general
duty to "protect the safety and welfare of the public," and not a special duty to citizens
whose property is on fire. Id It is possible, however, for a plaintiff to successfully argue
that a fire on her property triggers a special duty on the part of firefighters to come to
her aid. See infra Section III C of this Note for further discussion of this possibility.
17. 92 Wash. 2d 762, 600 P.2d 1282 (1979) (en bane).
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by state ferry system workers.' The court refused to find that an ille-
gal strike is, by itself, tortious.' 9 Dismissing monetary damages and
inconvenience as foreseeable consequences of the strike, the court
stated that private actions against strikers would disrupt the balance of
power in labor negotiations.' Yet the court left open the possibility of
private actions if the injured party proved that the strike fulfilled the
elements of a particular tort.2"
In these three cases, the courts refused to allow private lawsuits in
the absence of specific statutory authority granting such rights. More-
over, these courts held that the circumstances involved were unexcep-
tional and therefore failed to warrant private actions.22 Plaintiffs
cannot easily prove exceptional situations, and many state courts hesi-
tate to admit that a private action is appropriate in even the most ex-
treme circumstances.
B. Actions Allowed in Restricted Circumstances
Some state courts allow claimants to maintain private actions in re-
18. Id at 776, 600 P.2d at 1290. Washington State Ferry Systems workers went on
strike during Labor Day weekend. Businesses on several Washington islands claimed a
substantial loss of revenues from decreased tourism due to the illegal strike. The court
held that because the damages were merely an incidental result of the strike, the strikers
were not liable for lost revenue. Ia at 768, 600 P.2d at 1286.
19. 92 Wash. 2d at 776, 600 P.2d at 1290. See also supra note 14.
20. 92 Wash. 2d at 766, 600 P.2d at 1285. The court held that creating a private
cause of action in the absence of one in the anti-strike statute "could substantially inter-
fere with progress towards the goal of labor peace." Id One commentator rejected this
argument, noting that state legislatures are more likely to be concerned with preventing
strikes of essential public employees than with maintaining a balanced employer-em-
ployee relationship. Allowing private causes of action serves the legislature's goal of
preventing strikes. Damage Liability, supra note 2, at 1102.
21. 92 Wash. 2d at 768, 600 P.2d at 1286. The court held that "a public employee
union may be held to answer for its torts." Id These plaintiffs, however, failed to prove
facts necessary to make out a prima facie tort, so the court refused to impose damages
on the union. Id See also Damage Liability, supra note 2, at 1112.
22. The courts in the three preceding cases implied that in some specific fact situa-
tions a private cause of action might survive. For example, the Hammond court stated
that if the fire department owed some special duty to a plaintiff whose property burned
during an illegal firefighters' strike, that plaintiff could recover damages. However, the
fact that the plaintiff's property caught fire alone failed to create a special duty. 449
N.E.2d 1184. If the plaintiff had an individual contract with the firefighters obligating
them to extinguish any fire on the plaintiff's property, the firefighters would probably
owe a special duty to that plaintiff. In such an admittedly unlikely circumstance, the
court might hold firefighters liable for any fire damage which occurred to the plaintiff's
property during an illegal strike. Id at 1187.
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stricted circumstances. For example, the court in State v. Kansas City
Firefighters Local No. 4223 permitted the state to sue a firefighters'
union for damages incurred during an illegal strike. 24 The city sum-
moned the National Guard to fight fires during a strike. Although
statutory provisions existed to reimburse the National Guard out of
general revenues, the court allowed the state to recover its costs from
the firefighters' union. Since the damages incurred by the state were a
foreseeable consequence of the strike, the union was liable.25 Further,
the state could maintain its action against the union on behalf of the
city, for whose benefit the legislature enacted the anti-strike statute.26
The court declined, however, to give a private cause of action to any
party beyond the state or municipality.
27
In a later Missouri case, Berger v. City of University City,28 the court
conditionally allowed individuals a private cause of action against the
chief of an illegally striking fire department, if they could show that the
chief sought to prevent firefighters from neighboring communities from
fighting a fire in his jurisdiction.29 However, the court held both the
23. 672 S.W.2d 999 (Mo. 1984).
24. Id at 104. When Kansas City firefighters engaged in a four day strike, the state
incurred expenses of nearly $130,000 when it replaced striking firefighters with the Na-
tional Guard.
25. The court held that even though the state had a fund to pay for its National
Guard expenses, the strikers committed a legal wrong. Therefore, under the theory of
ubi ius, ibi remedium-where there is a right there is a remedy-the officials of the
striking union were liable for the state's expenses. Id. at 109.
26. Some authors argue that public employees owe a duty to members of the com-
munity because individuals are the third party beneficiaries of public employee con-
tracts. Note, Private Damage Actions Against Public Sector Unionsfor Illegal Strikes, 91
HARV. L. REv. 1309 (1978) [hereinafter cited as Private Action Against Public Unions].
Courts, however, generally reject this approach. Therefore, individuals who wish to sue
illegally striking public employees should use a theory of action other than breach of
duty to a contractual beneficiary.
27. 672 S.W.2d at 110. The court held that the legislature enacted the state's no-
strike clause. Mo. ANN. STAT. § 105.500 (Vernon 1978), to benefit the "public body
... that is, the public employer." Id Thus, the municipality that employed the strikers
had the right to maintain a damage action for losses incurred from the strike. Id. An
individual who lost property to a fire during the illegal strike, on the other hand, would
probably be unable to maintain a private action because individuals are not the intended
beneficiaries of the law. See supra note 22, and infra Section III C, notes 85-90 for
further analysis of this problem.
28. 676 S.W.2d 39 (Mo. App. 1984).
29. Id. at 42. Firefighters from neighboring communities attempted to extinguish a
fire on plaintiff's property, but picketing firefighters threatened them with physical vio-
lence. As a result, plaintiff's business burned down completely. Id. at 40-41.
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city manager and any police official exempt from liability when the fire
department refused to fight fires during the illegal strike.30 Moreover,
the court failed to hold the city liable for failing to enforce its anti-
strike ordinances. 3
These two cases show that some courts are willing to allow private
actions in limited circumstances. Plaintiffs cannot entertain private
suits absent a special relationship to the strikers,32 or unless the strikers
affirmatively prevented others from fighting fires.33
C. Private Causes of Action Allowed in a Broad Range of
Circumstances
Some state courts impose few restrictions on private causes of action
against illegally striking municipal employees. Caso v. District Council
3734 was the first state court decision permitting a private action
against public employees for damages resulting from an illegal sewage
workers' strike. In Caso, the New York Appellate Court held that the
Taylor Law,35 New York's anti-strike legislation, was not the exclusive
30. Id. at 41. Plaintiff sued police officials and the city manager for their failure to
prevent strikers from threatening the firefighters who attempted to extinguish the fire.
The court held that these officials had a duty to protect the general public rather than to
aid individuals (other than those in custody of the officials).
31. Plaintiffs claimed the city was liable for violating a local ordinance by failing to
provide adequate police protection to firefighters. Id at 41.
32. See supra notes 15, 16 and 22 and accompanying text.
33. See, e.g., Boyle v. Anderson Firefighters Local 1262, 497 N.E.2d 1073 (Ind. Ct.
App. 1986); and infra notes 43-49 and accompanying text.
34. 43 A.D.2d 159, 350 N.Y.S.2d 173 (N.Y. App. Div. 1971). The court implied a
private cause of action from the anti-strike statute. 43 A.D.2d at 162, 350 N.Y.S.2d at
176-77. See supra note 31. On the issue of implying a private cause of action, see gener-
ally Damage Liability, supra note 2, at 1092-96.
Although Caso was the first case to grant a private cause of action against striking
public employees, earlier plaintiffs unsuccessfully attempted to recover damages in pri-
vate actions against public employees. Jamur Prod. v. Quill, 51 Misc. 2d 501, 273
N.Y.S.2d 348 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1966) is apparently the first case brought against a public
employee union. A corporation sued the unions representing New York City Transit
Authority workers who engaged in an illegal strike for alleged diminution of stock val-
ues. The court found for the strikers, holding that the corporation was not the intended
beneficiary of the labor contract and that the damage alleged was too remote from the
strike to support a private action. Ie at 509, 273 N.Y.S.2d at 355.
35, The relevant portion of the statute provides:
Section 210. Prohibition of Strikes
1. No public employee or employee organization shall engage in a strike, and no
public employee or employee organization shall cause, instigate, encourage, or
condone a strike.
1988]
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remedy against striking public employees.36 Therefore, the court per-
mitted the various communities whose waters and beaches were pol-
luted by raw sewage emitted during the strike to recover damages from
the union.37 Because the legislature enacted the Taylor Law to protect
the public from illegal work stoppages by public employees, the court
held that private actions against violators would further the state's
purpose.38
In Pasadena Unified School District v. Pasadena Federation of Teach-
ers 9 the California Court of Appeals found an unlawful strike by pub-
2. (a) Violations and penalties. A public employee shall violate this subdi-
vision by engaging in a strike or violating paragraph (c) of this subdi-
vision and shall be liable as provided in this subdivision pursuant to
the procedures contained herein. In addition, any public employee
who violates subdivision one of this section may be subject to removal
or other disciplinary action provided by law for misconduct.
N.Y. Civ. SERV. LAW § 210 (McKinney 1983).
36. Even though the anti-strike statute lacks an express provision for a private cause
of action, the court found that such a provision would further the legislature's goals.
Caso, 43 A.D.2d at 162, 350 N.Y.S.2d at 177. Private causes of action effectuate legisla-
tive intent to prevent strikes by essential public employees. The court in State v. Kansas
City Firefighters Local 42, 672 S.W.2d 99, 110 (Mo. App. 1984), correctly notes "that
the traditional injunction, fine and contempt remedies have not deterred the public
strike in areas of vital concern.... A private cause of action will impose a cost the
decision to strike must reckon with." Thus, private causes of action seem to be the only
effective method of preventing strikes by public employees. See also infra note 52 and
accompanying text.
37. Caso, 43 A.D.2d at 162, 350 N.Y.S.2d at 177. The court stated further that
although the Taylor Law governed public employees' relationship with the municipal
government, the law did not govern public employees' relationships with the general
public. Id. at 161, 350 N.Y.S.2d at 176. Thus, when wastes were emitted into waters in
and around Manhattan and were washed up on the beaches of several towns during a
sewage workers' strike, only the town's officials had a private cause of action for dam-
ages against the strikers. Id
38. 43 A.D.2d at 163, 350 N.Y.S.2d at 178. The stated purpose of the Taylor Law
is "to promote harmonious and cooperative relationships between government and its
employees and to protect the public by assuring, at all times, the orderly and uninter-
rupted operations and functions of government." N.Y. CIv. SERV. L. § 200 (McKinney
1983).
39. 72 Cal. App. 3d 100, 140 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1977). The court held that the state
anti-strike provision was an integral part of the contract between the teachers' union
and the public school board. Therefore, an illegal strike sanctioned by the union is a
breach of that contract, and the union is liable for tortious inducement to breach. Fur-
ther, engaging in an illegal strike is a per se tort for which damages are recoverable. Id.
The court held: "In the absence of legislative authorization, public employees in Cali-
fornia did not have the right to strike .... " 72 Cal. App. 3d at 104, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 44,
(citing Los Angeles Met. Transit Auth. v. Brotherhood of R.R. Trainmen, 54 Cal. 2d
684, 687, 355 P.2d 905, 906, 8 Cal. Rptr. 1, 2 (1960)).
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lic school teachers to be the basis of a private cause of action. The
striking school teachers' union alleged that the no-strike provision in
their contract infringed upon their first amendment right to strike.'
The court rejected this argument and denied that the union was privi-
leged "to induce a breach of contract by calling an illegal strike."41
Because the strike was illegal under California law and the school dis-
trict was harmed by the action, the union could be liable in either tort
or contract.42
Recently, the Court of Appeals of Indiana decided Boyle v. Anderson
Firefighters Local 1262,43 which presented an issue of first impression
in that state. The plaintiffs sued the municipality, the local, national,
and international unions, and individual firefighters when his business
burned during a strike." The court immunized the municipality from
40. The school district sued the teachers' union for inducing an unlawful strike by
the teachers. The court implied that the result may have been different if the union had
merely advocated the teachers' right to strike. 72 Cal. App. 3d at 108, 140 Cal. Rptr. at
45.
41. Id at 105, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 44. The court quoted In re Porterfield for the
proposition that prohibiting public employee strikes does not violate first amendment
rights. The Porterfield court held:
The right of free speech protected by the federal and state constitutional guaranties
is not an absolute right which carries with it into businesses and professions total
immunity from regulation in the performance of acts as to which speech is a mere
incident or means of accomplishment. It was not intended that a right to speak for
the purpose of profit may be created to the derogation of the police power of state
or city.
The freedom of speech and of the press protected by the constitutional guaranties
included in the main, it has been said, freedom of expressions on political, sociolog-
ical, religious, and economic subjects, not commercial activities to which speech is
only an incident or means.
168 P.2d 706 (Cal. 1946) (en banc).
42. 72 Cal. App. 3d 111, 140 Cal. Rptr. 48. The author of Damage Liability, supra
note 2, noted the court's approach favorably. Because public employee strikes are ille-
gal, the union's action in calling a strike is a tortious inducement to engage in illegal
activity and to breach an employment contract. Therefore, the union can be held liable
under tort and contract theories. Damage Liability, supra note 2, at 1116-17.
43. 497 N.E.2d 1073 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986). In Boyle, the strikers refused to fight a
fire and also allegedly prevented firefighters from other communities from attempting to
extinguish the blaze until a union official reprimanded the strikers. Id. at 1076.
44. Id. at 1077. Plaintiffs argued that the city was liable for failing to provide alter-
native means of fighting fires during a strike. Further, plaintiffs claimed the city should
have enforced anti-strike provisions. The court ruled that the city was immune from
liability on each of these counts because its actions were discretionary, and the Indiana
Tort Claims Act immunized the municipality from liability for failure to enforce laws.
Id. at 1077-78. See also supra note 15.
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suit by refusing to apply the doctrine of respondeat superior, finding
that illegally striking workers act outside the scope of their employ-
ment.45 The local, national, and international unions, and thus the
striking firefighters themselves, however, could be liable for damages if
they induced the strike or supported the strikers in any way.46
Boyle is unique for expressly holding individual firefighters liable for
damages resulting from a strike.47 Some courts have intimated that
individual public employees may be liable for particularly grievous ac-
tions during a strike.4" Prior to Boyle, however, no court had imposed
individual liability for fire damage during a strike because of the uncer-
tain causal connection between the strike and property lOSS.4 9 Boyle,
therefore, is unprecedented, and the court's approach is central to this
Note.
II. PERMISSIBILITY OF PRIVATE ACTIONS
Should private causes of action be allowed to supplement statutory
remedies to compensate victims of illegal firefighter strikes? Some
courts and commentators suggest allowing a private cause of action,
45. Employees are clearly acting on their own behalf, not for the benefit of their
employer, during any strike. Further, the court stated that by striking, the firefighters
were "patently inconsistent with the city's interest in providing uninterrupted fire pro-
tection." The court further held that the strikers' "acts were so outrageous as to be
incompatible with the duties owed the public and the city and beyond the scope of their
employment." Id at 1078.
The city is also immune because firefighting is a discretionary function that does not
lead to liability. Id at 1077-78, citing City of Hammond v. Cataldi, 449 N.E.2d 1184
(Ind. Ct. App. 1983). See supra note 13.
46. There was some evidence that members of the national union met with the strik-
ers to offer encouragement and to urge firefighters from other communities to refrain
from putting out fires in Anderson. Boyle, 497 N.E.2d at 1083.
47. The court stated that "when a tortfeasor voluntarily commits a wrongful act in
reckless disregard of the natural and probable harm that is likely to follow, the law
presumes that the tortfeasor intended the consequences proximately owed by the inten-
tional act, and the tortfeasor may be held liable therefore." Id. at 1080. Thus, the
question of whether fire damages would have occurred even if the firefighters had not
been on strike is irrelevant.
48. See supra notes 15, 16 and 22 and accompanying text.
49. Id Firefighters have never before been held individually liable for damages that
occurred during strikes due to the difficulty of proving a causal relationship between the
strike and the actual fire damage. In other words, if firefighters do not actually start a
fire, it is difficult to attribute a fixed amount of damages to a failure to fight a fire not
started by striking firefighters. However, allowing individual liability is a strong strike
deterrent, so the Indiana court's holding is wise. See also infra note 66 and accompany-
ing text.
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unless an express statutory prohibition exists, to deter costly and dan-
gerous illegal strikes.50 Others contend that private actions would up-
set the delicate legislative balance between meaningful labor
organization and collective bargaining by public employees and the
public's need for safety and security.5"
The threat of private actions can be a strong deterrent to public em-
ployee strikes.52 Damages against illegally striking firefighters can
reach millions of dollars.53 Clearly, if a local union or individual
firefighters are liable for damages, their resources will quickly evapo-
rate. Even if a national or international union indemnifies the firefight-
ers, funds are limited, so strikes would be short.54 Allowing private
actions would essentially make such strikes economically infeasible.
Firefighters would strike only if the anticipated gain in increased bar-
gaining power would outweigh possible monetary damages. 5  There-
50. See generally Dripps, supra note 1, at 591-92. The author argues that the tradi-
tional bases for disallowing private actions are unfounded, and that private actions are a
sound deterrent to public employee strikes.
51. For example, the court in Burns, Jackson, Miller, Summit & Spitzer v. Lindner,
59 N.Y.2d 314, 329-30, 451 N.E.2d 459, 465 (1983), argued that allowing private ac-
tions imposes such a burden on public employee unions that it would "overdeter"
strikes.
52. One commentator described the deterrent effect of private actions:
Damage actions impose a cost on public employee unions for illegal strikes. Every-
thing else being equal, this cost will tend to discourage unions from striking and
thus further the policy against illegal strikes. And this deterrence is likely to oper-
ate more effectively than sanction spelled out under a statute because of the large
number of potential plaintiffs.
Note, Statutory and Common Law Considerations in Defining the Tort Liability of Pub-
lic Employee Unions to Private Citizens for Damages Inflicted by illegal Strikes, 80
MICH. L. REv. 1271, 1286 (1982) [hereinafter cited as Statutory Considerations].
Damage actions against individual strikers will provide an even stronger deterrent to
essential public employee strikes than damage actions against a union because a union is
better equipped to handle damage liability than an individual striker.
53. See supra note 3.
54. Short strikes resulting from limited funds are less effective than longer strikes
because an employer can simply "weather the storm." If the duration of a strike ap-
pears indefinite, an employer is more likely to give in to strikers' demands.
55. Dripps, supra note I, at 605. Professor Merton Bernstein suggested two alterna-
tives to traditional public sector strikes which are less damaging to the public welfare
and may alleviate the economic infeasibility of prolonged strikes to the union. First,
Bernstein suggests a nonstoppage strike, where employees continue to work, with both
the employees and the employer contributing equally to a special strike fund. The em-
ployer, to prevent the loss of its contribution, would thereby be pressured into negotiat-
ing. Since the loss to each side would be less than in a traditional strike, both would
have sufficient time to bargain without harming the public. Second, Bernstein suggests
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fore, allowing private actions and the subsequent economic risk will
deter public employees from striking illegally.56
Most state anti-strike legislation does not provide for private actions.
State remedies against striking public employees typically include pen-
alties such as injunctions,57 fines,5" loss of dues check-off,59 union
a gradual strike, whereby union members stop work for a half day during the first week
of a strike, a full day during the second week, and so on. This plan has the advantage of
pressuring both sides to negotiate reasonably without subjecting the public to a com-
plete and sudden deprivation of essential services. Bernstein, Alternatives to the Strike
in Public Labor Relations, 85 HARV. L. REv. 459, 470-74 (1971). Note, however, that
this article was written before any case held that individuals harmed by public employee
strikes could maintain private causes of action against the strikers.
56. Damage Liability, supra note 2, at 1089.
57. State statutes providing for injunctions generally follow this pattern:
Injunction
Sec. 111.89 Strike prohibited
(1) Upon establishing that a strike is in progress, the employer may either seek an
injunction or file an unfair labor practice charge with the commission under
§ 111.84(2)(e) or both. In this regard it shall be the responsibility of the de-
partment of employment relations to decide whether to seek an injunction or
file an unfair labor practice charge. The existence of an administrative rem-
edy shall not constitute grounds for denial of injunctive relief.
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 111.89(1) (West Supp. 1981).
58. State statutes providing for fines against illegal strikers are generally similar to
that of Nevada:
See. 288.250 Punishment of employee organization, officer or employee by court
for commencement or continuation of strike in violation of order.
1. If a strike is commenced or continued in violation of an order issued pursuant
to NRS 288.240, the court may:
(a) Punish the employee organization or organizations guilty of such viola-
tion by a fine of not more than $50,000 against each organization for each
day of continued violation.
(b) Punish any officer of an employee organization who is wholly or partly
responsible for such violation by a fine of not more than $1,000 for each
day of continued violation, or by imprisonment as provided in NRS
22.110.
NEv. REv. STAT. § 288.250(1)(a), (b) (1979).
59. Loss of dues check-off privileges, a strong weapon, is allowed against Delaware
public school teachers:
Loss of dues check-off privilege
See. 4011. Observance of teaching contract; violation; strike.
.... If an employee organization designated as exclusive representative shall vio-
late the provisions hereof, its designation as exclusive representative shall be re-
voked ... and said employee organization and any other employee organization
which violates any of the provisions hereof shall be ineligible to be designated as
exclusive representative for... 2 years.... If any employee organization violates
the provisions hereof, the public school employer shall refrain from making payroll
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decertification, 6° and dismissal of striking employees.6 1 Some courts
would allow private lawsuits against public sector employees only if the
anti-strike legislation expressly provides for this supplemental deter-
rent. Courts hesitate to impose liability beyond that sanctioned by
legislatures.62
Most anti-strike legislation was written before Caso, the first case
allowing a private cause of action in addition to state sanctions against
illegally striking public employees.63 Therefore, plaintiffs may argue
deductions for that organization's dues for a period of I year thereafter. (emphasis
added)
DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 14, § 4011(a), (b) (1974).
60. A good example of a decertification statute can be found in the Iowa code:
Decertification of the union
Sec. 20.12
5. If an employee organization or any of its officers is held to be in contempt of
court for failure to comply with an injunction pursuant to this section, or is
convicted of violating this section, the employee organization shall be immedi-
ately decertified, shall cease to represent the bargaining unit, shall cease to
receive any dues by checkoff, and may again be certified only after twelve
months have elapsed... The penalties provided in this section may be sus-
pended or modified by the court, but only upon request of the public employer
and only if the court determines the suspension or modification is in the public
interest.
IOWA CODE ANN. § 20.12(5) (West 1978).
61. Dismissal, the harshest remedy against striking employees, is exemplified by the
Florida Code:
Dismissal
Sec. 477.507
(5) If the commission, after a hearing... determines that an employee has vio-
lated § 447.505, it may order the termination of his employment by the public
employer. Notwithstanding any other provision of law, a person knowingly
violating the provision of said section may, subsequent to such violation, be
appointed, reappointed, employed, or reemployed as a public employee, but
only upon the following conditions.
(a) Such person shall be on probation for a period of 6 months following his
appointment, reappointment, employment, or reemployment, during
which period he shall serve without tenure. During this period, the per-
son may be discharged only upon a showing of just cause.
(b) His compensation may in no event exceed that received by him immedi-
ately prior to the time of the violation.
(c) The compensation of the person may not be increased until after the
expiration of 1 year from such appointment, reappointment, employ-
ment, or reemployment.
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 447.507(5) (West 1981).
62. See supra note 7.
63. Caso v. District Council 37, 43 A.D.2d 159, 350 N.Y.S.2d 173 (N.Y. App. Div.
1971). See supra notes 34-43 and accompanying text. See also Statutory Considerations,
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that state legislators did not consider the possibility of private lawsuits
when framing anti-strike provisions. Thus, they would argue that the
lack of legislative reference does not bar private actions. Opponents of
judicially imposed private actions argue that state legislatures could
have amended their statutes after Caso to allow private actions if the
legislatures so intendedf"
The better position is to allow private actions in addition to statuto-
rily created sanctions against illegally striking firefighters. In addition
to their deterrent effect, private actions compensate people who may
have suffered increased fire damage due to an illegal strike.65 More-
over, state and municipal employers may be reluctant to impose severe
penalties on strikers because of the fear of creating a hostile working
environment after the strike.66 Therefore, private causes of action may
be the only effective remedy for illegal public employee strikes.67 Fur-
ther, since the private sector cannot readily provide fire protection to
replace striking employees, it is extremely important to effectively deter
strikes.68 Finally, although only a limited number of public safety em-
supra note 52, at 1274-75. The author argues that legislatures could not possibly have
considered private actions when writing anti-strike statutes because such actions did not
yet exist for public employee strikes. Therefore, the absence of language should not
preclude private actions. Id
64. Caso was decided in 1971, seven to fifteen years before t other cases discussed in
this Note.
65. See supra notes 3 and 42.
66. One author observes:
Of course, a damage action, even if more effective and useful than other measures,
might be as much against a public employer's best interests as other measures.
After a strike, an employer may wish to return to a harmonious working relation-
ship with its employees as quickly as possible. A damage suit brought by an em-
ployer probably would cause resentment among the employees and interfere with
the reestablishment of a good working relationship with the union.
Damage Liability, supra note 2, at 1090. Further, a civil damages suit may remain in
the courts for several years, so resentment among strikers may linger for a long time.
Id at 1090 n.22.
67. Damage Liability, supra note 2, at 1088-89. The author states that dismissing
strikers, the most effective remedy for illegal strikes, is not feasible for highly trained
and skilled workers, such as police officers or firefighters. If the city dismisses strikers,
the public is without essential public service employees while replacements are trained,
a clearly undesirable alternative. Therefore, municipal employers lack a sufficient
means by which to deter illegal public employee strikes. Id.
68. When public employees strike, particularly police and firefighters, the entire
supply of their services is removed from the market. This differs from the private sec-
tor, where a number of firms provide similar services, and a strike against one firm may
reduce the supply rather than removing it entirely. Dripps, supra note 1, at 597-98.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol34/iss1/8
ILLEGAL FIREFIGHTER STRIKES
ployees may strike, the strikers can prevent other public safety officials
from carrying out their duties.69 For the foregoing reasons, it is espe-
cially important to effectively deter strikes or hold strikers individually
liable for damages when nonstriking firefighters are unable to do their
job.70
III. THEORIES OF RECOVERY IN PRIVATE ACTIONS
A. Intentional Interference with a Contractual Relationship
A city suing a union in connection with an illegal strike may allege
that the union intentionally interfered with the city's contractual rela-
tionship with its employees.71 Individuals harmed by public employee
strikes who plead contractual interference, however, generally have
been unsuccessful.72 Although individuals incidentally benefit from
public employee contracts, since municipalities are the intended benefi-
ciaries, only they can allege intentional interference.7" The court in
Pasadena Unified School District held striking school teachers liable to
the school board under this theory.74 Private citizens, however, have
not similarly prevailed."
69. For example, in Boyle, strikers allegedly refused to allow anyone into a burning
building until a union official directed them to let the volunteers in. Boyle v. Anderson
Firefighters Local 1262, 497 N.E.2d 1073, 1076 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986).
70. In Boyle, the non-striking firefighters attempted to extinguish the fire. However,
they were not able to extinguish the fire without the strikers' assistance. 497 N.E.2d at
1076.
71. This theory was unsuccessfuly applied in Bums, Jackson, Miller, Summit &
Spitzer v. Lindner, 59 N.Y.2d 314, 323, 451 N.E.2d 459, 462, 464 N.Y.S.2d 712, 715
(1983). See supra note 51.
72. To succeed on an intentional interference claim, the plaintiff must prove that
she is a member of the class of intended beneficiaries of the contract. Theoretically,
members of the public are the class protected by labor contracts between municipalities
and public employees. Courts, however, generally hold that the party protected by
these contracts is the municipality. Since the municipality has no duty to provide these
services to the public, individuals are generally unable to plead intentional interference
with respect to illegal public employee strikes. Private Actions Against Public Unions,
supra note 26, at 1321-27.
73. See supra note 72.
74. Pasadena Unified School Dist. v. Pasadena Fed'n of Teachers, 72 Cal. App. 3d
100, 113, 140 Cal. Rptr. 41, 49 (1977). See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
75. See, e.g., Berger v. City of University City, 676 S.W.2d 39, 41-42 (Mo. App.
1984) (firefighters lack a duty to particular individuals as a result of municipal employ-
ment). Individuals are not the intended beneficiaries of a contract between the munici-
pality and the firefighters. Therefore, individuals cannot maintain an action for
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B. Per Se Tort
Since public employee strikes are generally illegal, either under com-
mon law76 or by statute,77 an anti-strike law violation could lead to a
per se tort claim. Unless the strikers intend to cause damage by ille-
gally striking, 78 such a claim may fail. A per se tort exists only if a
defendant commits an unlawful act which causes harm or damage to
another. 79 The court in Burke & Thomas, however, refused to find an
illegal strike tortious by itself."0 Therefore, plaintiffs are unlikely to
prevail under this theory.
C. Prima Facie Tort
Violating an anti-strike law may be prima facie evidence of a tort.81
To successfully allege a tort, the plaintiff must prove that she was in a
special class of citizens entitled to a higher duty of care from the strik-
ers than the average citizen.82 Although this theory of recovery is gen-
erally unsuccessful against strikers in such non-essential service areas
as public transportation,83 it may be effective in suits against firefight-
damages resulting from the breach of a contractual duty. Cf Jamur Prod. v. Quill, 51
Misc. 2d 501, 273 N.Y.S.2d 348 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1966). See supra note 30.
76. Dripps, supra note 1, at n.7.
77. Id.
78. Evidence of a statutory violation is generally agreed to be negligence in itself,
regardless of the intent of the offender. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
TORTS 200 (1941). Therefore, if public employee strikes are prohibited by law, the act
of engaging in a strike alone is illegal and is negligence per se. See also Pasadena Uni-
fied School DisL, 72 Cal. App. 3d 100, 140 Cal. Rptr. 41, and supra note 39.
79. Pasadena Unified School Dist., 72 Cal. App. 3d at 112, 140 Cal. Rptr. at 48.
80. Burke & Thomas, Inc. v. International Org. of Masters, Branch 16, 92 Wash. 2d
762, 768, 600 P.2d 1282, 1286 (1979). The court held that the strikers intended to put
pressure on the employer, and not to injure any third party. Therefore, the court held
that the strike was not tortious. See supra notes 16-19 and accompanying text.
81. In some states, statutory violation is merely prima facie, rather than per se,
evidence of a tort. W. PROSSER, supra note 78, at 201. Further, some states require a
plaintiff to prove that the striker owed her a duty in addition to proving a statutory
violation. Because of the level of proof required in these states, private actions against
striking public employees are generally unsuccessful. See generally Bums, Jackson,
Miller, Summit & Spitzer v. Lindner, 59 N.Y.2d 314, 451 N.E.2d 459, 464 N.Y.S.2d
712 (1983).
82. The court in City of Hammond v. Cataldi, 449 N.E.2d 1184, 1187 (Ind. 1983),
stated, however, that firefighters have no special duty to individual citizens above that
owed to the public; therefore, striking firefighters did not commit a tort although the
strike was illegal.
83. See generally Jamur Prod. v. Quill, 51 Misc. 2d 501, 273 N.Y.S.2d 348 (N.Y.
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ers. A successful claimant would thus allege that firefighters owe a
higher duty to a citizen whose property is on fire than to the general
public.8 4 The Cataldi85 and Berger 6 courts, however, rejected this
theory.
D. Public Nuisances
One court defined public nuisance as "any reasonable interference
with the rights common to all members of the community in general
... [encompassing] the public health, safety, peace, morals, or conven-
ience.""7 A strike by firefighters is clearly a public nuisance because it
is unreasonable, illegal, and involves foreseeable danger.88 A firefight-
ers' strike interferes with the rights of all taxpayers who reasonably
expect that public employees will protect them from the dangers of
fire. 9 Finally, firefighter strikes are a public nuisance because they
Sup. Ct. 1966) and supra note 34. The court held that "not every violation of a statute
gives rise to civil liability on the part of the violator." In Jamur, striking transit work-
ers were not liable to the public for damages because the anti-strike statute lacked a
provision for a private cause of action. Id. at 504, 273 N.Y.S.2d at 351. The court
interpreted the legislature's failure to expressly grant a private action as a prohibition.
Id
84. This duty requirement is similar to the same concept in negligence law. Munici-
palities lack a duty to provide police and fire protection to their citizens. One author,
however, stated:
The issue is not whether government owes private citizens a duty to provide serv-
ices, but whether public employee unions owe a duty not to interfere with the serv-
ices that government chose to provide... Analogizing illegally striking public
employees to private citizens who negligently interfere with the delivery of vital
services is more precise than equating them with a sovereign who has no duty to
provide services.
Statutory Considerations, supra note 52, at 1298-99.
Thus, because firefighters have a duty not to strike, they can be liable for breaching
that duty in the event of a strike. This is a good policy argument, but courts have been
unwilling to accept it.
85. City of Hammond v. Cataldi, 449 N.E.2d 1184 (Ind. 1983). See supra notes 13-
16 and accompanying text.
86. Berger v. City of University City, 676 S.W.2d 39 (Mo. App. 1984). See supra
notes 28-31 and accompanying text.
87. State v. Kansas City Firefighters Local No. 42, 672 S.W.2d 99, 114 (Mo. 1984).
The Kansas City Firefighters court held that a firefighters' strike was a nuisance, in part
because the resulting damages were reasonably foreseeable. Id.
88. Losses from fires during firefighters' strikes may include destruction of property,
loss of life, injury to persons, and so forth. See supra note 3 for details of such losses.
89. If citizens cannot rely on the firefighting services provided by a municipality,
they will be forced to contract for private fire protection services. In fact, fire protection
services are so expensive that some cities themselves contract for independent fire pro-
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pose a clear danger to the public health, safety, and convenience. 90
Public nuisance is the clearest basis for imposing liability on striking
firefighters. The court in Fulenwider v. Firefighters Association Local
178491 stated that although any condition deliberately and directly cre-
ated by an illegal firefighters' strike could be termed a nuisance, dam-
ages incidental to a strike do not constitute a nuisance.92
IV. POSSIBLE DEFENDANTS IN PRIVATE CAUSES OF ACTION
A. Public Employee Unions
Public employee unions are often defendants in private actions for
illegal public employee strikes.93 Unions represent the illegally striking
individuals, offer financial support from special strike funds,94 and or-
tection services from private security companies. Private Sector Fire Services Expand in
U.S., URBAN INNOVATIONS ABROAD (April 1982), reprinted in 10 CURRENT MUN.
PROBS. 363, 364 (1984).
90. Professor Prosser defines nuisance as follows:
Meaning of Nuisance
Nuisance is a term which has been surrounded by much confusion. Properly ap-
plied, it refers to the invasion of two quite unrelated types of interests:
"Public nuisance" is a term applied to a miscellaneous group of minor criminal
offenses, which obstruct or cause inconvenience or damage to the public in the
exercise of rights common to the public.... The interference may be intentional,
or negligent, or may result from an extra-hazardous activity for which strict liabil-
ity is imposed. It must result from conduct of the defendant which is found to be
unreasonable in the light of its utility and the harm or risk which results....
Public Nuisance
A public nuisance is an act or omission which obstructs or causes inconvenience
or damage to the public in the exercise of rights common to all. A private individ-
ual may maintain an action for a public nuisance only if he suffers special damage,
distinct from that common to the public.
PROSSER, supra note 74, at 549, 566.
Certainly, firefighters' strikes are criminal offenses which damage the public. The
intended result of a strike, higher wages, is unreasonable in light of the risks to property
and human life which occur during the strike. See supra note 3. Finally, an individual
who loses property or a loved one in a fire during a strike has suffered a loss greater than
that suffered by the general public. Clearly, an individual can recover from firefighters
for damages suffered as a result of an illegal strike.
91. 649 S.W.2d 268 (Tenn. 1982).
92. Id. at 272. See supra notes 8-11 and accompanying text.
93. For example, a public employee union could be held liable in Boyle v. Anderson
Firefighters Local 1262, 497 N.E.2d 1073, 1083 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986). The local, state,
national, and international divisions of a union may all be liable for actions of union
members if they were involved in the strike in any way. Id.
94. Plaintiffs in Boyle alleged that the local and national unions offered financial
support and other encouragement for the duration of the strike. Id.
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ganize and advise the individual strikers on how to effectively use the
strike to achieve certain goals.95 Since unions have larger cash reserves
than individual strikers, they are a natural target of plaintiffs. The
Pasadena Unified School District,96 Kansas City Firefighters,97 and
Boyle9" courts all held unions liable for damages from illegal public
employee strikes.
B. Individual Strikers
In Boyle, the Indiana Supreme Court recently held that individual
firefighters could be liable for damages resulting from their strikes.99
This novel approach is an extremely effective way to insure that essen-
tial public services are always available. The striking firefighters in
Boyle refused to respond to an alarm and prevented firefighters from
neighboring communities and volunteers from putting out the fire.b°°
Courts should extend the Boyle holding to include liability for any
strike by firefighters or other essential public service employees because
strikes are a clearly foreseeable and dangerous breach of duty. 1 '
95. If the court believed the Boyle plaintiff's contention about strikers allowing
firefighters to do their job only after a union official told them to do so, the union ad-
vised the strikers about the best way to carry out the strike. IcL See also supra note 46
and accompanying text.
96. Pasadena Unified School Dist. v. Pasadena Fed'n of Teachers, 72 Cal. App. 3d
100, 140 Cal. Rptr. 41 (1977). See supra notes 39-42 and accompanying text.
97. State v. Kansas City Firefighters Local No. 42, 672 S.W.2d 99 (Mo. App. 1984).
See supra notes 24-27, 32-33 and accompanying text.
98. Boyle v. Anderson Firefighters Local 1262, 497 N.E.2d 1073 (Ind. Ct. App.
1986). See supra notes 43-49 and accompanying text.
99. 497 N.E.2d 1073 (Ind. Ct. App. 1986). See supra note 49 and accompanying
text.
100. The actions of the strikers actually caused more damage by blocking access to
the fire. However, it seems best to allow private causes of action against any illegally
striking firefighters, regardless of their actions during the strike, to deter illegal strikes.
See supra note 3.
101. The foreseeability of damage in firefighters' strikes is so clear that private re-
course for damages suffered as a result of such strikes must be allowed. E. Wohlers,
One Strike and You May Be Out The Legal Realities of the Hardball Game of Fire
Fighter and Police Strikes, 15 IDAHO L. Rv. 39, 46 (1978). The foreseeability of dan-
ger is comparable to that in negligence law. There, a risk is a danger if it "is apparent,
or should be apparent, to one in the position of the actor... [and] must be reasonable."
W. PROSSER, supra note 74, at 220-21. Because the risk of harm inherent in a firefight-
ers' strike is foreseeable and unreasonable, striking firefighters should be liable for the
consequences of their actions. See supra note 90.
1988)
Washington University Open Scholarship
250 JOURNAL OF URBAN AND CONTEMPORARY LAW [Vol. 34:231
V. CONCLUSION
Strikes by public safety employees pose a severe and foreseeable
threat to property, and more importantly, to human life. Therefore,
strong sanctions are necessary to protect the public. Effective deter-
rents, such as private actions against individual strikers, are the most
certain means of assuring adequate public protection. Unless state leg-
islatures choose to expressly restrict their availability, courts should
allow private actions against unions and individual strikers to deter
firefighter strikes.
Melissa Lucerne Wood*
* J.D., Washington University, 1988.
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